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ABSTRACT
Data exploration systems that provide differential privacy
must manage a privacy budget that measures the amount of
privacy lost across multiple queries. One effective strategy to
manage the privacy budget is to compute a one-time private
synopsis of the data, to which users can make an unlimited
number of queries. However, existing systems using synopses
are built for offline use cases, where a set of queries is known
ahead of time and the system carefully optimizes a synopsis
for it. The synopses that these systems build are costly to
compute and may also be costly to store.
We introduce Overlook, a system that enables private data
exploration at interactive latencies for both data analysts
and data curators. The key idea in Overlook is a virtual
synopsis that can be evaluated incrementally, without extra
space storage or expensive precomputation. Overlook simply
executes queries using an existing engine, such as a SQL
DBMS, and adds noise to their results. Because Overlook’s
synopses do not require costly precomputation or storage,
data curators can also use Overlook to explore the impact
of privacy parameters interactively. Overlook offers a rich
visual query interface based on the open source Hillview
system. Overlook achieves accuracy comparable to existing
synopsis-based systems, while offering better performance
and removing the need for extra storage.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy has become a key issue for all organizations that
collect personal data, from companies to government enti-
ties [42, 4, 24]. After organizations collect a dataset, they
would like to make it available to internal data analysis teams,
or even expose it to external researchers [42], without leaking
a significant amount of information about any individual in
the dataset. To be broadly useful, a private data analysis
system should support ad-hoc, exploratory queries through
familiar interfaces while making it easy for the data curator
(the administrator configuring the system) to control the
amount of information leaked.
The most widely used framework for reasoning about pri-
vacy is differential privacy (DP) [12, 14]. Differential privacy
quantifies the privacy cost of a statistical analysis through a
privacy budget ; a smaller privacy budget implies more error
in the query results but more privacy for the individuals in
the dataset.
Although many research systems provide differential pri-
vacy [31, 22, 15, 25, 26, 40], these current systems are chal-
lenging for organizations to configure and use, especially for
ad-hoc exploratory analysis. At a high level, current DP
systems fall into two categories:
1. Systems with per-query budgeting: Systems such
as PINQ [31] and FLEX [22] ask users to select a privacy
budget, ε, for each query they execute. The total privacy
leakage of the system is then bounded by the sum of
these ε values. These systems are complex for both
users and data curators to use. Users typically have a
limited total privacy budget available, εtotal, and need to
decide how to divide it between the queries they submit;
when they run out of budget, they can no longer make
queries. In addition, two users that collaborate can reveal
information proportional to the sum of their budgets,
so data curators must carefully limit which users can
access the system. Such systems would be unsuitable for
exposing a research dataset to the public, for instance [42].
2. Synopsis-based systems: Systems such as PrivateSQL
[25] generate a synopsis data structure that can answer
a specific class of queries after taking in a dataset, a
description of the query class, and a total privacy budget ε.
Users can then query the synopsis arbitrarily many times
without revealing additional information beyond the ε
budget. These systems are more suitable for exploratory
analysis and for public access, but unfortunately, they
are also challenging to use. Constructing the synopsis
requires solving an expensive optimization problem to
minimize the error it will produce for a specific query
workload, which can take hours even for a modest dataset,
and the synopsis can consume a large amount of space,
on par with the original data, making it costly for large
datasets.
In this paper, we present Overlook, a system that makes
synopsis-based differential privacy practical for one of the
most common types of data analysis: visual exploratory
analysis of immutable datasets. Visual query interfaces,
such as Tableau [41], are one of the most common ways for
organizations to expose data internally, and produce a class of
queries that are a good fit for synopsis data structures (mostly
counting queries). In Overlook, we seek to make private
visual queries accessible to both data users and data curators,
by designing a system that lets curators tune a synopsis
interactively to set privacy parameters, and lets users query
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data interactively at a similar cost to their existing data
analysis infrastructure. Overlook runs as an interposition
layer in front of existing analytical engines, such as any
SQL RDBMS, enabling organizations to benefit from the
scalability and optimizations of these existing engines and to
offer private visual query interfaces over existing datasets.
The key idea in Overlook is a virtual synopsis data struc-
ture that represents the noise that would be added by a
classical synopsis algorithm in a highly compressed format
using a pseudo-random function (PRF). For any counting
query (e.g., counting the users in a dataset by country),
Overlook can use the virtual synopsis to compute just the
noise that should be added to each tuple in the query re-
sult. Overlook simply adds this noise to the results from
an existing query engine. Thanks to this design, users can
run queries at a similar speed to their existing query engine,
with extra computation that is only proportional to the num-
ber of output tuples (e.g., number of bins in a histogram).
Likewise, data curators can use Overlook to explore param-
eters of the virtual synopsis interactively, e.g., change the
total privacy budget ε and see its results on several queries.
Overlook’s synopses are based on the hierarchical histogram
mechanism [19, 8], a synopsis design that supports multidi-
mensional queries, and can be tuned by curators to provide
different noise levels for different dimensions in the data.
Overlook also offers a rich privacy-aware visual query in-
terface built on virtual synopses, based on the open source
Hillview system [1]. In particular, we extend most of the
built-in visualizations in Hillview, such as histograms and
heatmaps, to display information about the noise introduced
by DP, and to automatically coarsen the visualization when
the noise exceeds the discernible signal. These automatic
adjustments all query the virtual synopsis, so they do not
cause any additional privacy leakage. Data visualization
has some unique features that make it a good candidate for
a synopsis based approach to DP: most queries could be
expressed as (combinations of) count queries, for which there
are good synopses. Secondly, the visualization itself intro-
duces errors via the quantization to the pixels in the screen.
We found that this inherent approximation often masks the
error introduced by DP. Finally, typically data visualization
interfaces already incorporate methods for presenting errors
and approximations to the user (e.g., via confidence intervals
and error bars). These tools help the user understand the
results the differential privacy mechanism produces.
Unlike prior systems, Overlook provides an interface for
both the data curator as well as the data analyst. The data
curator, who manages and has access to the raw data, must
make decisions about the privacy parameters used to build
the synopsis. Overlook’s curator UI lets the curator quickly
see the impact of adjusting various privacy parameters, such
as bins for categorical features and privacy budgets along
different data dimensions, on multiple visual queries. To our
knowledge, Overlook is the first system to provide interactive
feedback for tuning a DP synopsis.
We implement Overlook using the Hillview UI, and de-
velop backends to let it run either over a SQL DBMS or over
Hillview’s built-in distributed execution engine [1], a high
performance in-memory query engine that supports approxi-
mate query processing for common visualization queries. In
both cases, Overlook benefits directly from the optimizations
in the underlying engine.
We evaluate Overlook against the algorithms for computing
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Figure 1: Overlook architecture.
synopses in DAWA [26] and PrivateSQL [25], and other algo-
rithms in DPBench [18]. Although many of these algorithms
build workload-aware synopses, which are optimized for a
specific set of queries [29], we find that Overlook’s workload-
agnostic virtual synopses offer similar levels of error in query
results when given the set of visualization queries as input.
The key intuition is that in an exploratory analytics setting
with many possible queries, a synopsis that “balances” the
noise over the possible queries will perform well, and it is not
useful to solve a complex optimization problem [39, 37, 19].
Moreover, Overlook’s virtual synopses require no precompu-
tation and minimal storage over the underlying histogram.
We show that Overlook achieves the same scaling properties
as the underlying database while requiring no more than
2.5× the time required to compute equivalent non-private
queries. Overlook requires only a 32-byte key for its synopsis,
compared to existing synopses that require kilobytes of space
to store and potentially gigabytes of memory to compute.
To summarize, our contributions are:
1. We present Overlook, the first differentially private visual
analytics system that provides interactive configuration
for data curators and simultaneously supports arbitrary,
interactive ad-hoc queries for users by leveraging syn-
opses.
2. We introduce virtual synopses, a data structure to repre-
sent DP synopses for multidimensional counting queries
that can be used incrementally to add noise to a specific
query instead of requiring costly precomputation and
storage.
3. We develop a privacy-aware interactive visualization UI
for both data users and data curators, including a novel
curation UI that lets curators see the effect of configuring
virtual synopsis parameters interactively.
Overlook is open source at http://github.com/vmware/
hillview.
2. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 1 shows the architecture of Overlook. A data
analyst interacts with Overlook through a browser interface
that allows them to issue queries to the Overlook root node.
The root dispatches the query to the backend, applies a
privacy mechanism to the returned result, and returns the
private result to the user.
The raw data resides on a possibly distributed set of trusted
servers; a centralized root receives histogram queries and
dispatches them to the servers. The root also stores relevant
privacy parameters used to compute the private response to a
histogram query. The trusted data curator can make changes
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to these privacy parameters until the dataset is published,
at which point the privacy parameters as well as the dataset
must become immutable. The untrusted data analyst can
only access published data through the private results of
histogram queries. The privacy parameters are assumed to
be public and visible to both the data curator and the data
analyst. The privacy parameters are discussed further in
Section 2.3.
Overlook primarily supports histogram queries. A his-
togram query over a column takes as input a set of disjoint
buckets and returns the number of data items that fall in
each bucket. In Overlook, these counts are perturbed with
noise consistent with a differentially-private mechanism, de-
scribed further in Section 4. Overlook allows users to issue an
arbitrary number of histogram queries on privately-published
data, with no privacy budget restriction. Histogram queries
are sufficient to support a large number of visualizations,
including histograms, heat maps, pie charts, trellis plots,
and CDFs. The visualizations supported in Overlook are
described in Section 2.2.1.
In addtion to histogram queries, Overlook’s interface has
support for other count-based queries, such as the number
of NULL values in a column.
2.1 Threat model
We assume untrusted users, who can make an unbounded
number of queries to the Overlook backend through the
Overlook UI. Users may communicate with each other and
make queries in parallel or from multiple sessions. Users
cannot modify privacy parameters, view raw data, or alter
any secret key stored on the root. Side-channel and denial-
of-service attacks are out of scope in our work.
The data curator is trusted and has access to the raw data
and privacy parameters. The curator may not modify data
or parameters once a dataset has been published, as doing
so would violate differential privacy.
The distributed backend is entirely trusted, including the
root server as well as servers hosting the raw data.
2.2 User interface
The data curator and data analyst both access Overlook
through interfaces that are extensions of the Hillview data vi-
sualization system [1], which provides a browser interface for
interacting with charts and data. The curator UI is similar
to the analyst’s view, except that the curator may addition-
ally modify privacy parameters and generate new histogram
queries under the new parameters prior to publishing the
dataset.
The result of a histogram query is displayed as an inter-
active plot. Additional queries can be made by zooming in
using the mouse by selecting an interval, which issues a new
histogram query to the backend.
Note that, while the frontend is an extension to Hillview,
Overlook can be used with any backend that supports count
queries. In Section 5, we describe one such alternate imple-
mentation using MySQL.
2.2.1 Supported visualizations
Overlook supports two main categories of private data sum-
maries: (1) histograms, and (2) counts of specific values, such
as NULL values. Multi-dimensional histograms encompass a
number of useful visualizations, including the traditional 1-
Figure 2: Histogram plot with CDF curve overlaid. The
data at the mouse position is shown in a semi-transparent
white rectangle; notice that the bar size (count) is given as
an interval, and confidence intervals are plotted for each bar.
dimensional histogram but also heat maps, pie charts, trellis
plots, and CDFs.
In addition, the user interface displays schema metadata
including standard values such as the column type, but also
the privacy policy associated with a column or group of
columns.
Histograms. Overlook’s main primitive is a histogram
query. This primitive can be applied to create a variety of
useful visualizations:
• Histogram queries over a column (with numeric or categor-
ical data). The visual presentation can be a bar chart with
confidence intervals, as shown in Figure 2, or, for example,
a pie chart, which emphasizes percentage of the whole that
falls within each bucket.
• Cumulative distributions functions (CDF) over a column
(numeric or categorical). CDF plots are always shown to-
gether with a histogram plot. Figure 2 shows a histogram
plot with an overlaid CDF curve.
• Histogram queries over a pair of columns, each of which
can be either numeric or categorical. This can be visually
presented as a heat map as in Figure 3, or for example a
trellis plot of 1-dimensional histograms.
One important feature of Overlook is that it displays es-
timates of uncertainty about the data. For 1-dimensional
histograms, this is in the form of 99% confidence intervals.
The presentation of uncertainty is discussed further in Sec-
tion 6.
Counts. In addition to histograms, Overlook supports
releasing certain useful counts (“degenerate histograms”)
privately:
• In many views, the system displays information about the
number of elements and the number of NULL values in a
column.
• Distinct count queries: these estimate the number of dis-
tinct values in a column.
2.3 Curator interface
The data curator’s job is to decide which columns and
pairs of columns will be released privately, and to then decide
the privacy level for each of those data releases. Overlook’s
curator UI helps the data curator make these decisions.
For each set of columns that is to be released privately,
the curator must specify a corresponding privacy policy.
This policy provides Overlook with information about public
values that can be used in the histogram as well as parameters
that are used to instantiate the privacy mechanism. The
curator’s view of the Overlook UI allows the curator to
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Figure 3: Heatmap on two columns. The color shows the
count for each combination of values. Values with low confi-
dence are hidden, and the user can highlight with the mouse
values within a specific range.
edit these policy settings and generate sample charts on a
dataset before it is published. In this section, we describe
the parameter settings the curator can choose in a privacy
policy.
While specifying a policy for every such histogram may
be impractical, Overlook provides some useful default values
for the convenience of the curator. While curators should
be careful to choose parameters that are public and inde-
pendent of the data, we note that the curator’s decisions
may nevertheless leak information because they are made
based on the true underlying dataset. Devising methods to
add differential privacy to this kind of human-in-the-loop
parameter selection is an interesting avenue for future work.
2.3.1 Privacy levels
For each set of columns to release, the curator specifies
a corresponding value ε that denotes the privacy level that
should be used to release the column. A smaller value of ε
typically results in more privacy at the cost of more noise in
the private output. The curator can explore many values of
ε for each set of columns before deciding which privacy level
gives the best tradeoff between data privacy and utility for
potential analysts.
2.3.2 Data ranges
On the first histogram query a user makes for a column,
Overlook must return a histogram over a sensible range,
after which the user can zoom in to regions of interest.
A non-private visualization could compute the true min-
imum and maximum values in the dataset and return a
histogram over the full range. Computing these values in a
differentially-private manner is a considerably more complex
task [13]. Instead, Overlook requries the data curator to
specify publicly-visible values for the initial minimum and
maximum for each column in the privacy policy. As in prior
work [31, 21], the curator must be careful to not choose
values closely associated with specific data points.
2.3.3 Quantization
In Overlook, the data curator must specify a public quan-
tization, or partitioning, of the data. The need for this is
twofold:
1. The synopsis used in Overlook, detailed in Section 3,
operates over a finite, enumerable data domain.
2. When displaying histograms on categorical data, Overlook
uses the curator-specified bin boundaries as public labels
for the bins.
To illustrate the second point, consider a column that
contains the names of patients in a hospital. A non-private
histogram might reveal specific names through the choice of
bin labels. In Overlook, a curator may set the quantization
boundaries to be the letters ‘A’ through ‘Z’, so that the finest
unit of aggregation is the first letter of the name, and no
individual’s name is leaked in the published histogram.
The idea of public partitioning has been explored in prior
systems [31, 21], but the partitioning in those systems has
been left up to the data analyst to specify. In contrast, in
Overlook, the data curator specifies the bin boundaries, and
can therefore choose a set of boundaries that is appropriate
for the dataset and provides good visual utility to analysts.
Importantly, Overlook never fully materializes a quantized
version of the dataset. Instead, the quantization policy is
expressed implicitly as a function that maps data points their
quantized versions.
3. DEFINITIONS AND DATA MODEL
We consider a tabular dataset X = {x1, . . . , xn}, xi ∈
A = A1 × . . .×Ad, which consists of n rows and d columns
or attributes. This dataset could be the result of a join on
multiple tables or a materialized view.1 Each column i takes
values in the domain Ai, which must be finite and public
(which can be achieved implicitly by applying the privacy
policy to each column at query time).
Our goal is to answer queries from some set Q, where each
q ∈ Q is a function q : An → Y. A mechanism for answering
queries from Q is a randomized algorithmM : An ×Q → Y.
Following [12], a mechanism M is ε-differentially private if
for any two databases X,X ′ which differ in a single row,
∀Y ⊆ Y,Pr[M(X, q) ∈ Y ] ≤ eε Pr[M(X ′, q) ∈ Y ].
Intuitively, this means that adding, removing, or changing
any one row of the dataset will not change the probability of
an event under the differentially-private mechanism by more
than a pre-specified multiplicative factor, eε. An extensive
line of work has explored the construction of mechanisms
that achieve this guarantee [14, 43]. The most common
mechanisms add random noise to the raw result according
to the Laplace distribution. In a histogram visualization,
this manifests as random perturbations to the counts for
each bar. Our challenge is then to choose a mechanism that
gives good visual utility to the user in spite of these random
perturbations (§3.2) and implement it efficiently (§4).
Importantly, throughout this section we assume that the
mechanism operates over data which has already been quan-
tized according to the privacy policy, and therefore belongs to
a finite and public domain A. In practice, this quantization
happens on demand, at query time; the quantized dataset is
not materialized.
3.1 Query model
Overlook primarily supports one- and two-dimensional
histogram queries.2
1 We note that a line of prior work [36, 5, 34, 21, 25] con-
siders limiting the sensitivity of joins in differential privacy.
Overlook assumes all released views are materialized and pro-
vides only per-row privacy in the materialized view, but, as
Overlook operates over a standard database backend, these
techniques could be incorporated in the future.
2Larger dimensions can be accommodated easily, but his-
tograms and heat maps are most relevant to the visualization
setting.
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The basic building block of a histogram query is computing
the count of the elements that belong to a bucket; a bucket
is in general a k-dimensional rectangle.
For example, a 1-dimensional histogram query with ` buck-
ets specifies a column i and a set of `+ 1 bucket boundaries
h0 < h1 < . . . < h`. The query returns a vector of ` counts,
one for each interval [hi, hi+1).
Note that, although the domain Ai must be finite and
public, the bucket boundaries hi can be any value specified by
the user. For example, if Ai = {0, 1, 2}, the user may query
the range [0.5, 1.5). In this case, Overlook would privately
return the (noisy) count corresponding to the value 1 (the
only value in the quantized domain that falls in the query
range). We are careful to note that this count corresponds
to the data after quantization.
Overlook also supports releasing certain counts, such as
counts of NULL or missing values, privately apart from the
histograms. These can be made private simply by perturbing
the count with noise distributed as Lap(1/ε) [12]. The data
curator must take into account the additional privacy cost
of releasing these values.
3.2 Synopsis mechanism
Certain families of queries permit a special type of mech-
anism that produces a private summary called a synopsis.
Such a mechanism can be decomposed into two stages:
1. It releases a synopsis S =Mε(X) of the dataset, which
is guaranteed to be ε-differentially private, and is inde-
pendent of the queries q ∈ Q.
2. On input q ∈ Q, it computes an answer S(q) using only
the synopsis. Since the answer is computed by post-
processing the synopsis, and post-processing does not leak
privacy [12], the answer is differentially private. Further,
there is no limit to the number of queries that a user can
submit.
Given a column of a dataset over a finite, enumerable data
domain Ai of size m, one can build a histogram of m buckets
containing the count of each element in the domain. Making
this histogram private na¨ıvely requires adding Laplace noise
with scale Lap(1/ε) to each of m buckets. Answering an inter-
val query of size t then adds t independent random Laplace
variables to the result. The error of such a mechanism scales
as
√
t [8].
However, adding this much noise to each query is sub-
optimal. Instead, Overlook uses a mechanism called the
hierarchical histogram [19, 8], also referred to as Hb in the
literature. The error of this mechanism scales as log2b(t)
rather than
√
t. At a high level, the hierarchical histogram
builds a tree such that nodes higher in the tree correspond to
progressively larger contiguous intervals in the domain. Each
internal node of the tree corresponds to an interval of the
histogram that is the union of its b children, and the mecha-
nism adds noise with scale Lap(logb(m)/ε) to each internal
node. For such a tree with branching factor b, an arbitrary
interval of size t can be computed by taking the union of
only (b− 1) logb(t) nodes: the number of noise variables now
scales logarithmically, rather than linearly, in the interval
size. Figure 4 shows such a tree with branching factor 2 (also
called a “dyadic” tree).
A multidimensional rectangle query can be computed by
taking the Cartesian product of its decomposition in each
axis, as illustrated in Figure 5, for a heatmap over columns
i, j.
Quantized domain Ai
Dyadic interval
decomposition
c([0, 4))
c([0, 2))
c(0) c(1) c(m)
Figure 4: Tree used in a hierarchical histogram with b =
2. The tree for column i is constructed for the quantized
domain Ai. Each internal node in the tree corresponds to the
count for a contiguous interval in the domain, and receives
independent random Laplace noise. In this example, the
grey internal nodes in the tree can be used to compute the
count for the grey range in the domain.
Intervals over Ai
Intervals over A
j
Figure 5: Interval decomposition for a 2D histogram
(heatmap). The decomposition in two dimensions is sim-
ply the Cartesian product of the decompositions in each
dimension.
3.3 Discussion
Why use hierarchical histograms. Hierarchical his-
tograms are just one of many mechanisms that have been
proposed in the literature (see the surveys of [19, 39]). We
choose to implement hierarchical histograms for two reasons:
1. Data-obliviousness. Hierarchical histogram mechanisms
are oblivious to the data. They only need to know the
quantization, which is public knowledge in our setting.
This makes them particularly suitable for exploratory
data analysis. We do not need any expensive processing
of the data to compute quantization boundaries, which
several data dependent mechanisms require.
2. Error guarantees. A systematic comparative study of
various data-dependent and data-indpendent mechanisms
was performed by [18]. They found that for large datasets,
the Hb mechanism typically results in less error than any
other mechanism.
Optimizing the shape of the tree. Changing the topol-
ogy of the tree yields different tradeoffs between accuracy
and privacy [39]. The shallower the tree, the less the sensi-
tivity of the resulting synopsis, hence the less noise we need
to add per node of the tree. But then the number of nodes
we need to sum might be large for some ranges, which means
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Algorithm 1 Overlook virtual synopsis.
Input: range R for which to compute private count,
branching factor b, domain size m, privacy level ε, column
index i, true count c(R), PRF key k
Output: noisy count cˆ(R)
Set scale s = dlogb(m)e/ε
Set N(R)← B-adicDecomposition(R, b)
Set cˆ(R) = c(R)
for v ∈ N(R) do
cˆ(R)+ = `(F (k, (i, v)), s)
end for
return cˆ(R)
Algorithm 2 Computing the b-adic decomposition for a
range.
Input: interval R = (rl, rr), rl ≥ 0, rr > rl; branching
factor b
Output: nodes N(R) = (v1, . . . , vn) in tree corresponding
to R, indexed by (start, interval size)
function B-adicDecomposition(R, b)
Set N(R)← {}
Set L = rl
if |R| == 0 then
return N(R)
end if
while L < rr do
pL = −1;
if rl > 0 then
pL = blogb(L)c . Largest power of b that
divides L
end if
ps = blogb(rr − L)c . Largest power of b that fits
in remaining interval
p = pL < 0 ? pS : min(pL, ps)
nodeSize = bp
N(R) = N(R) ∪ {(L, nodeSize)}
L+ = nodeSize
end while
return N(R)
end function
those queries produce noisier results. The tradeoffs between
these parameters have been studied extensively in [39]. The
best choice of b depends on what type of queries one wishes
to optimize for.
Setting privacy parameters.
The simplest option for the curator is to rely on the basic
composition theorem [43, Lemma 2.3] which states that the
privacy leakage adds up across mechanisms. Hence, for range
queries of dimensionality i the curator might specify a value
εi, such that
∑
i≤k εi = ε. The curator may then partition
each εi (uniformly or otherwise) across the d
i mechanisms
that answer i-dimensional range queries. Overlook’s privacy
policy allows the curator to specify the value of εS for each
set of columns S independently. A curator with greater
expertise in differential privacy may take advantage of ad-
vanced composition theorems [43] to optimize the choice of
ε for a table.
4. VIRTUAL SYNOPSES
An important requirement for releasing a private synopsis
is that random noise is added once, when the synopsis is
constructed, and must not be resampled on future queries
to the synopsis. For the hierarchical histogram mechanism,
this requirement na¨ıvely would mean that Overlook would
have to store a random sample for every node in the synopsis
tree, a storage overhead that grows linearly in the size of the
domain.
Our solution is to use a cryptographically secure pseudo-
random function (PRF) F : (K,X ) → Z. Informally, a
PRF guarantees that, given a small random key k in the
key space K, F (k, ·) will be indistinguishable from a truly
random function R : X → Z to a computationally-bounded
adversary. (See e.g. [6] for a formal definition.)
In our setting, the inputs X to F are nodes in the hi-
erarchical histogram synopsis for a given column, each of
which corresponds to a contiguous interval in the underlying
domain. F takes as input a node index v, a column index i,3
and the key k associated with a table, and returns a uniformly
distributed random sample F (k, (i, v)), which we then trans-
form to a sample from a Laplace variable `(F (k, (i, v)), s)
with the appropriate scale s.
Using the PRF, we are able to reduce the storage cost
of the synopsis from linear in the domain size to a small
constant – in fact, only the 32 bytes required to store the
key associated with a given table.
We incorporate the PRF into the hierarchical histogram
mechanism as follows. A range R can be decomposed into
a minimal set N(R) of internal nodes in the synopsis tree,
each of which corresponds to a sub-interval of R. For each
v ∈ N(R), we can use the PRF to compute `(F (k, (i, v)), s),
the random noise corresponding to that interval. Then, if the
true count in the interval is c(R), we can compute the private
count for the interval as cˆ(R) = c(R)+
∑
v∈N(R) `(F (k, (i, v)), s).
(For a domain of size m, the scale s is dlogb(m)e/ε.)
Algorithm 1 describes the synopsis algorithm in detail. For
completeness, we also describe the algorithm for computing
a b-adic decomposition of an interval in Algorithm 2.
Because the PRF is ultimately deterministic (though in-
distinguishable from random), this algorithm satisfies the
requirement that queries to the synopsis will not require
resampling noise, although we have not explicitly stored any
samples.
This use of random number generators to save space is
similar in spirit to the use of such generators in streaming
algorithms [3].
Cryptographic security. It is important to note that
the PRF used to generate random samples must be cryp-
tographically secure. If one can somehow reverse-engineer
the generator and compute `(k, (i, v)), then one can subtract
it from the end result and obtain the true count c(v). A
cryptographic PRF ensures that, even if an adversary knows
`(k, (i, v)) for some v, perhaps because they know c(v) as
auxillary information, the adversary still cannot efficiently
compute `(k, (j, v′)) for a new value and column. This addi-
tionally requires that the key k associated with a table must
be stored securely on the root node.
3Multi-dimensional histograms are also assigned unique in-
dexes, which can then be used with the PRF in the same
manner; the general PRF for a node in a d-dimensional
histogram with index i is F (k, (i, v1, . . . , vd)).
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Section 5.2.1 further describes the implementation of vir-
tual synopses in Overlook.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented Overlook by extending the open-
source Hillview [7] visualization system. However, to make
the case that a system like Overlook could be implemented
as an agent between any suitably powerful UI and a generic
database, we have extended Hillview with a custom back-end
that generates SQL queries in the SQL dialect of MySQL. We
then have added the Overlook differential privacy layer on top
of both these back-ends: the Hillview in-memory database
and MySQL. For both cases the adaptations required were
minimal; the MySQL engine is completely unmodified. We
describe them in the following sections.
In this section, we describe implementation details for the
UI (§ 5.1), privacy interposition layer (§ 5.2), and Hillview
and MySQL backends (§ 5.3).
5.1 User interface
For data interaction and presentation we reuse the UI of
Hillview [1]. This UI is written in TypeScript and runs in
any modern web browser. To support differentially private
visualizations we had to modify a few hundred lines of code.
The most significant changes are (1) the data presentation of
uncertainty (confidence intervals) that is inherent in differ-
entially private results, and (2) the curator interface, which
enables the curator to edit the privacy parameters interac-
tively. We believe that displaying the confidence intervals
significantly enhances the usefulness of a visualization tool.
5.2 Privacy layer
The privacy layer of Overlook is implemented in Java. It
is sandwiched between the web server layer and the query
generation and execution layer. When a new dataset is
opened, the privacy layer checks for the existence of related
privacy metadata to decide whether a data source should be
treated as differentially private.
5.2.1 PRFs for virtual synopses
The virtual synopsis described in Section 4 uses a PRF
to generate noise. In practice, we use AES-256 as the PRF.
The root node stores one AES key per table, which ensures
that no two tables are released using the same PRF. In the
same vein, columns and pairs of columns are labeled with
unique and immutable IDs so that no two synopses within a
table share random samples.
On receiving an interval query [hi, hj), the root computes
unique IDs of the nodes in the synopsis corresponding to this
interval. To generate a new Laplace sample for an interval,
the root uses the interval ID and column ID as input to AES
to generate random bits, which can then be transformed into
a Laplace sample using standard methods for converting bits
to doubles and then inverting the Laplace CDF.4
5.2.2 Confidence intervals
To approximate the α-confidence interval for a sum of
Laplace variables, we sample the corresponding distribution
and return the 1−α percentile value. Na¨ıvely this operation
4 We note that we do not currently implement the snapping
mechanism described in [33], but this is not fundamental to
our system design, and can be incorporated in the future.
would be performed for every bucket on every histogram
query. However, we observe that our synopsis guarantees
that every interval will be the sum of at most logd n random
variables (for a histogram of dimension d, where n is the
size of the domain). Therefore, the confidence intervals once
computed can be stored in a cache of size at most logd n.
Moreover, the confidence intervals are added as a postpro-
cessing step independent of the raw data, and therefore need
not be computed securely; the cache can be shared across
columns and tables.
5.2.3 Privacy policies
Overlook stores privacy policies in JSON format at the
root node. Any user or curator can query the privacy policy,
but only the curator is allowed to modify it.
5.2.4 Query rewriting
The query rewriting layer receives queries from the UI and
rewrites them to operate on quantized data. (The exception
is the “distinct count” query, which operates directly on the
raw data, and not on the quantized data.) We give a concrete
example about such query rewriting in our implementation
Section 5, where we describe the implementation of Overlook
using a traditional SQL database. Recall that the quanti-
zation parameters for a column are established by the data
curator. The quantization information describes a range of
intervals for the data values; data that falls outside all the
quantization intervals is treated as if it is a NULL value.
5.2.5 Adding noise to results
When the root receives the complete counts for the base
histogram, it queries the virtual synopsis for the noise to add
to each bucket and adds this noise to the histogram before
returning it to the UI.
5.3 Backends
Overlook’s operation can be adapted to use any back-end
that supports a rich enough query language to compute
standard histograms. We demonstrate this by describing
how it operates over two different back-ends: the Hillview
back-end, and one that operates on top of MySQL. We are
interested in highlighting the additional effort required for
adding privacy on top of an existing SQL-based query engine.
In this section we describe how this is done for the case of
histogram queries.
5.3.1 Hillview backend
Hillview is a MapReduce-like distributed query engine that
implements vizketches – mergeable sketches for visualization.
It implements a number of data-parallel aggregation tasks
suitable for visualization, including those used in Overlook.
Hillview is described in additional detail in [7].
The only change required to support privacy-related pro-
cessing is to adapt all the existing sketches to first quantize
the columns that they operate on according to the appropri-
ate privacy policy. No other changes were required in the
backend. This change amounts to less than 10 lines of code
in each sketch.
5.3.2 MySQL backend
Overlook can interface with unmodified, existing database
backends; we have implemented one such backend in MySQL.
In this section, we describe some of the queries implemented
in order to support the Overlook UI.
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Numeric histograms.
Consider a user request to display a (non-private) his-
togram of the data in a column C as a histogram with b
buckets. Let us assume first that C is a numeric column in
table t. This kind of visualization is executed using SQL
in two stages: (1) the range of the data in the column is
computed, and (2) the histogram is built. To obtain the
range of the data we generate the following query:
SELECT min(C), max(C), count (*), count(C)
FROM t
This query computes the minimum and maximum values
in column C, and also the number of non-null elements and
the number of total elements.
The UI receives these parameters and decides on a range
l–r of data and on a number of buckets b to display (in
some cases the UI does not need to issue any other query,
for example when all elements are NULL, or when l=r). The
query to compute a histogram is written as:
SELECT bucket , COUNT(bucket) FROM (
SELECT CAST(FLOOR((C - l) * scale)
AS UNSIGNED) AS bucket
FROM t
WHERE C between l AND r)
GROUP BY bucket
scale=b/(r-l) is computed statically before the query is
generated.
Quantized data view.
Since all private queries operate over quantized data, one
option is to pre-compute and materialize a view where all
columns are quantized using the curator-specified quantiza-
tion intervals. Such a query can be generated automatically
by the system once the privacy policy has been set. For
example, to create a view QV of a table with a single numeric
column C with equal-sized quantization intervals of size g
between qmin and qmax one can issue the following query:
CREATE view QV as
(SELECT qmin + FLOOR((C-qmin)/g)*g AS C
FROM t WHERE C between qmin AND qmax)
Private numeric histograms.
For the case of a private numeric column the general flow is
very much as described in the previous section; there are two
changes: (1) the query is executed over the quantized view,
and (2) after the histogram is computed noise is added to
each bucket. Let us assume that we are quantizing the data
to be within the range qmin and qmax with a granularity g.
The complete query that is executed is:
-- compute histogram
SELECT bucket , COUNT(bucket) FROM (
-- compute buckets
SELECT CAST(FLOOR((C - l) * scale)
AS UNSIGNED) AS bucket
FROM QV -- quantized view
WHERE C between l AND r)
GROUP BY bucket
String histograms.
Computing (non-private) histograms over a categorical
column is a bit more involved because the UI never displays
a large number of histogram buckets (more than can be shown
on the screen). The first step in computing a histogram over
a string column involves computing a set of distinct quantiles
over the column. For example, if the screen can accommodate
50 columns, then the UI will first issue a query to sort the
distinct values in the column and extract 50 equi-distant
values from the sorted set. These 50 values will be used as
histogram bucket boundaries. If the column has fewer than
50 distinct values then all values will be used as distinct
bucket boundaries.
SELECT DISTINCT BINARY C AS C FROM t
ORDER BY BINARY C
(One has to be careful with the sorting and comparison
order: these have to be consistent between the code that
computes the buckets and the database code that performs
comparisons and sorting. In our case we had to prevent
MySQL from doing default case-insensitive string compar-
isons in order to obtain consistent results — this is why we
used the BINARY keyword. We will omit it from the subse-
quent queries.)
To compute a histogram quickly over a set of explicit string
buckets the Java code generates an explicit binary search
tree using nested SQL IF expressions. For example, to build
a histogram with buckets separated by strings ‘A’, ‘G’, ‘M’,
and ‘Z’ it generates the following query:
SELECT bucket , count(bucket)
FROM (
SELECT (IF(C<‘G’,0,IF(C<‘M’ ,1,2))) AS bucket
FROM t
WHERE C BETWEEN ‘A’␣AND␣‘Z’)
GROUP BY bucket
Private string histograms.
Finally, computing private histograms requires modifying
the query for string histograms in a way similar to numeric
private histograms, by quantizing the data in the column
first. A quantization policy for a string column is given
essentially by a sorted list of strings. The quantization query
also makes use of a binary search tree. Let’s assume that our
quantization boundaries are ‘A’, ‘F’, ‘N’, ‘O’ and ‘Z’. The
quantization query is:
CREATE view QV as
(SELECT IF(C<‘N’,␣IF(C<‘F’, ‘A’,␣‘F’),
IF(C<‘O’,␣‘N’, ‘O’))␣AS␣C
␣␣␣FROM␣t
␣␣␣WHERE␣C␣BETWEEN␣‘A’ AND ‘Z’)
The query to compute a histogram over a quantized view
is the composition of these two queries:
SELECT bucket , count(bucket)
FROM (
SELECT (IF(C<‘G’,0,IF(C<‘M’ ,1,2))) AS bucket
FROM QV -- query the quantized view
WHERE C BETWEEN ‘A’␣AND␣‘Z’)
GROUP BY bucket
6. EXPERIENCE
Since we have built Overlook on top of the UI of an exist-
ing visualization tool, we can make a direct comparison of
the user experience for traditional and differentially-private
visualization. In this section, we describe some notable dif-
ferences between these user experiences.
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Figure 6: An example of a confidence interval (dotted box)
overlaid on a heat map legend. When a user hovers over a
heat map cell, Overlook highlights the confidence interval
for the box on the legend.
Browsing individual data items. The most conspicuous
difference is that many operations that are natural in a
normal visualization are unavailable when doing differentially-
private visualization. For example, enumerating the rows of
a table is something that cannot be done in a differentially-
private way. Traditional visualization systems can be used
for two purposes: detecting trends and identifying outliers.
A differentially-private visualization system can only be used
for the first purpose: differential privacy masks rare events.
Displaying uncertain values. A second difference is
that all counts that are displayed in a differentially-private
visualization are noisy. This can be interpreted as displaying
a value with uncertain range. Although there is substantial
work on the visualization of uncertain values, from our ex-
perience the interpretation of confidence intervals requires
a sophisticated understanding from users. While confidence
intervals are a useful tool to visualize uncertainty, they do
not prevent spurious high counts that users might confuse for
signal. This phenomenon has already been observed by [47].
Uncertainty in heat maps.
While uncertainty for histograms can intuitively be pre-
sented as a range around each count, it is less clear how
uncertainty should be displayed in a heat map. We proto-
typed multiple possible solutions to this problem.
Figure 6 shows a heat map legend in Overlook that displays
a confidence interval. When the user hovers over a cell,
Overlook highlights the confidence interval in the legend.
In addition, however, we would like to visually convey
the confidence in each cell on the chart itself. One way to
achieve this, shown in Figure 3, is to suppress any values
whose count is smaller than a multiplicative factor of its
confidence interval. As a result, only counts that are likely
to be informative are displayed.
Another idea is to use the whiteness of the image to convey
uncertainty. In figure 7, we demonstrate a prototype of such
a plot. The raw color scale is used to convey the count in
each cell, and the whiteness provides an additional dimension
that can be used to convey the amount of certainty a user
should have in the visualization.
Quantization intervals. The quantization intervals, es-
pecially for categorical data, have a huge impact on the
information that is conveyed to the user. As an example, we
show in Figure 8 several histograms of the exact same dataset
on the column “cities” with different quantization intervals.
The first histogram has on the X axis only the cities that
actually appear in the dataset, sorted alphabetically, so the
distribution of cities into buckets is quite different. The last
histogram allows the user to zoom-in further and explore
the distribution of data for each letter pair; the additional
structure is visible in the CDF which is more fine-grained (it
has 262 steps instead of just 26).
Query resolution. The amount of noise added to a
histogram/heatmap bucket R on columns S depends on
two primary factors: the extent of the bucket (the set of
quantization intervals that fall in R), and the S privacy
budget allocated for the set S of columns. The noise does
not depend on the actual data distribution; however, the
relative noise added does depend on the number of data
items that falls into the bucket R. So there is a trade-off
between the resolution of the query and its precision: if we
make buckets smaller, we can potentially see more detail in
the data, but the relative noise will be higher. If we make
buckets larger we lose the resolution but we gain precision.
There is no obvious choice in this trade-off, since it depends
very much on the data distribution. This is a trade-off that
the data curator can explore and to some degree control
by choosing the S and the quantization intervals for each
column.
Outliers or sentinel values. In one database we have
encountered a date column which was using a value year
of 9999 to indicate that an event has not happened yet.
Overlook in general releases counts for NULL values separately
from the hierarchical histogram synopsis, as NULL will not
be part of any range query. In contrast, this sentinel value
would be na¨ıvely included in the displayed histogram if the
specified public date range included values up to 9999.
7. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the design decisions made in
Overlook to support our claims that the system:
• allows data curators to quickly explore parameter settings
for synopses before data release (§ 7.1),
• implements a synopsis that provides accuracy comparable
to state-of-the-art methods (§ 7.2),
• achieves significantly lower storage cost than the synopses
implemented in prior systems through the use of a pseudo-
random function (§ 7.3), and
• retains the scaling properties of the underlying distributed
system with low performance overhead from privacy (§ 7.4).
In addition, we demonstrate that, in the visualization
setting, the error induced by differential privacy can be
smaller than a pixel on the screen – so that, with high
probability, the user loses no utility compared to the raw
visualization (§ 7.5).
Evaluation setup. Local experiments were run on a
machine with 16 GB of memory and 4 cores using an Intel i7
processor. Cloud experiments were run on an Amazon EC2
cluster of 15 machines with 8 GB of RAM and 2 cores each.
The Hillview backend uses Java 8.
7.1 Synopsis generation overhead
One benefit of Overlook is that it allows the data curator
to quickly explore privacy parameters for the data before
it is released. In particular, the data curator might change
the data quantization or privacy budget ε for any column.
Generating example visualizations with the new parameters
then requires recomputing the underlying synopsis.
We use DPBench [18] to evaluate the time required to gen-
erate a synopsis with the hierarchical histogram mechanism
against the time required for comparable synopses. We stress
that these times are not trivially comparable as DPBench is
primarily an accuracy benchmark that is not optimized for
performance.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7: Whitening to convey uncertainty. The color scale of the heat map conveys the value in each cell; whitening adds
an additional axis of color that can be used to convey uncertainty. (7a) Raw histogram with no noise or whitening. (7b)
Histogram with noise and no color adjustment. (7c) Whitening added to raw histogram on fine-grained bins. Each bin has a
small count relative to the standard deviation of the added noise, which is conveyed through the whiteness of the chart. (7d)
Whitening added to raw histogram on coarse-grained bins. Each bin now has a larger count relative to the standard deviation
of the data, so less whitening is applied.
Figure 8: Histogram with up to 26 buckets of a set of cities
quantized in different ways: (upper) public histogram with
adaptively chosen bin boundaries; (lower) quantization fixed
to two-letter boundaries. The shape of the histogram changes
according to the choice of bins.
We evaluate each method on a one-dimensional all-zeros
dataset of increasing size, on a workload of all intervals (the
workload that Overlook targets). These times do not include
the additional time required to compute the base histogram
of counts over which the synopses are computed. We evaluate
seven mechanisms in the literature: the baseline “identity”
mechanism [12], the binary hierarchical histogram [8, 19], the
hierarchical histogram with adaptive branching [19], DAWA
[26], MWEM [17], Privelet [44], and StructureFirst [46].
Figure 9 shows the results of the benchmark. Figure 9a
shows that MWEM and DAWA are by far the most expensive
algorithms, followed by StructureFirst. The remaining algo-
rithms run in under one second, so we plot these separately
in Figure 9b. While the time required for the hierarchical
mechanisms scales linearly in the data size, they are still con-
siderably less expensive to compute than more complicated
workload-aware synopses.
In fact, Overlook itself does not instantiate the synopsis
and computes the noisy values on the fly, so the synopsis adds
no precomputation overhead but does add some overhead at
query time. However, this overhead scales with the number
of histogram buckets in the query, rather than the size of the
domain or dataset. We benchmark Overlook query overhead
in Section 7.4.
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Figure 9: Time required to generate synopses using various
mechanisms, benchmarked using DPBench. MWEM and
DAWA dominate in the first plot; the second plot shows that
generating hierarchical histograms scales in the domain size,
when not using Overlook’s PRF-based construction.
7.2 Synopsis accuracy
Overlook uses hierarchical histograms as the underlying
synopsis. The primary benefit of the hierarchical histogram
is that the error scales logarithmically, rather than linearly,
in the size of the underlying dataset. However, more com-
plex optimization procedures [29, 26] may yield even better
accuracy.
In this section, we demonstrate empirically that Overlook’s
histogram mechanism achieves utility comparable to that
of state-of-the-art synopses. These results are supported by
prior work [39, 37, 19] that also investigates the empirical
accuracy of hierarchical histograms. More complex methods
work well for skewed or restricted query workloads, but
Overlook benefits from simple mechanisms because it aims
to support a very general set of range queries.
We benchmark accuracy on a dataset of 20 years of U.S.
flights [35]. This dataset contains both numeric and categor-
ical columns over a range of data distributions and domain
sizes (varying from 7 to over 4000). Figure 10 shows results
for histograms on all columns and heat maps on a selection
of columns. For each bar, we sample 5000 random intervals
or rectangles and compute the `1 distance between the vector
of true counts for all samples and the vector of noisy counts
returned by the mechanism.
The key takeaway from these figures is that the hierar-
chical histogram mechanism has comparable accuracy to
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(b) Heatmap accuracy. The baseline identity mechanism outper-
forms all others; the hierarchical mechanism nevertheless achieves
reasonable accuracy.
Figure 10: `1 error of Overlook mechanism on the U.S. flights dataset on 5000 randomly-sampled queries per column or pair of
columns.
mechanisms that perform more complex, workload-specific
optimization on the random-intervals workload. As noted in
[39], the benefits of this mechanism decrease as the dimension
increases. Adaptively choosing which mechanism to use for
a given visualization may be a direction for future work.
7.3 Synopsis memory overhead
Overlook’s synopsis mechanism has only 32 bytes of mem-
ory overhead required to store the AES secret key.
The synopsis mechanisms implemented by DPBench are
consistent mechanisms. These take as input a histogram over
the elements of the domain and output a synthetic histogram
as the synopsis over which all subsequent queries are run.
The size of the synopsis is therefore proportional to the size
of the data domain for a histogram, and grows exponentially
in the number of dimensions. (In particular, if the data is
small or especially sparse in the domain, the size may be
considerably larger than necessary to represent the data.)
We note, that these mechanisms may require a considerably
larger amount of memory at computation time. For example,
DAWA in two dimensions requires instantiating requires
instantiating a matrix representation of the workload [26].
For the workload that Overlook supports (the all-queries
workload), this requires a matrix of size n3. For such a
workload, a relatively small domain with 1000 quantization
intervals would require at least 8 gigabytes of memory simply
to compute the synopsis.
7.4 Overlook performance
In this section, we benchmark the performance of Overlook
and demonstrate that adding differential privacy does not
substantially slow down the system or change its underlying
scaling properties. In particular, the overall slowdown from
privacy is no greater than 2.5×.
7.4.1 Slowdown relative to public data
We first evaluate how much differential privacy causes
queries to slow down relative to queries on public data. In or-
der to understand the slowdown, we make two measurements
for each backend: first, the time required to quantize the
dataset, and second, the time required to answer a quantized
histogram query with noise added.
Figure 11 shows the average slowdown when plotting his-
tograms and heat maps on the U.S. flights dataset using
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(b) Heatmap slowdown.
Figure 11: Slowdown relative to raw (non-private) databases
for histograms and heat maps. In all cases, privacy adds at
most a 2.5× performance penalty.
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Figure 12: Average time to generate histograms for columns
in the flights dataset as the number of machines grows. The
data size grows with the number of machines, so the runtime
remains constant.
both the Hillview and MySQL backends. The slowdown is
below 2.5× for all configurations. In all cases, the majority
of the slowdown is a result of the quantization step. This
is intuitive: where each data point would initially have re-
quired one operation to add it to the appropriate bucket,
quantization adds an additional operation to round the point
to its nearest value in the public column domain.
7.4.2 Scaling
The Overlook frontend can be used with any SQL backend.
However, the Hillview distributed backend is powerful as it
retains Hillview’s ability to scale to large datasets.
We evaluate scaling using clusters of 1, 2, 4, 8,and 15
Amazon EC2 machines. The total dataset size is 58.2 GB,
split equally among the machines in the cluster. so for linear
scaling we expect the time required for each query to be
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roughly the same regardless of the number of machines. We
measure time to compute charts once the data is already in
memory.
In Figure 12 we show our measurements that evaluate
the time breakdown for computing histograms over the U.S.
flights dataset. Each point corresponds to the total time
required to compute a histogram or heat map for every
column or pair of columns. The overhead of privacy is the
same roughly 2× overhead as in Figure 11, but privacy does
not change the scaling behavior of the system at all, as
expected.
7.5 Visual error
At large enough data sizes, the error induced by differential
privacy can be smaller than the pixel-level rounding error
induced by the screen resolution. In particular, in a 1-
dimensional histogram, Overlook rescales the y-axis to the
maximum displayed value in order to make use of all of the
available vertical pixels.
Given p vertical pixels and a maximum displayed value of
y, each pixel represents a count of y/p. Hence, a confidence
interval of size less than y/p will be smaller than a pixel on
the screen. Assuming the case of a single Laplace random
variable added to each bucket (i.e. the “identity” mechanism),
we ask what value of ε would suffice to achieve this level of
error.
The inverse of the Lap(1/ε) distribution is given by
F−1(x) = −(1/ε) sgn(p− 0.5) ln(1− 2|x− 0.5|).
Then we would like F−1(0.95) < y/p for a confidence
level of α = 0.95. In this case, we arrive at an approximate
solution of ε > 2.303p/y. In other words, if the maximum
count is approximately 2.3 times the number of vertical
pixels, a privacy level of ε = 1 will likely result in no visible
difference from the raw data.
8. RELATEDWORK
Differentially private database management systems.
A number of prior systems make differential privacy available
through a SQL-like database API. PINQ [32] implements a
subset of SQL as well as a prototype visualization system
with incremental ε-budgeting. PINQ additionally pointed
out that joins have potentially unbounded sensitivity, and
several later systems [36, 5, 34, 21] propose methods for
mitigating this issue.
Other work considers additional variants on SQL-like pro-
gramming frameworks that allow developers to easily express
differentially private queries. Airavat [40] allows users to run
custom MapReduce queries on sensitive data by enforcing
differential privacy on the queries. Ektelo [49] exposes a
number of higher-level operators as a programming frame-
work for differentially private mechanisms. PrivateSQL [25]
uses synopsis-based mechanisms rather than incremental
budgeting to release dataset views. PrivateSQL introduces
the notion of view sensitivity as an approach to handle joins.
While Overlook does not explicitly target joins, such tech-
niques could naturally integrate with Overlook, as the join is
ultimately materialized as a tabular view of the data. Chorus
[23] implements differential privacy directly in SQL.
Most of these prior systems support a broad set of queries
written directly in SQL or a SQL-like language. In contrast,
Overlook restricts queries to those visualizations enabled
by the UI, which enables the release of a flexible and small
synopsis.
Synopsis-based mechanisms. A number of DP mech-
anisms [43] are designed to support all queries in a given
class of queries simultaneously. Recent work on synopses
include the matrix mechanism [27, 28, 30], wavelet trans-
forms [44], and approaches that incorporate data-dependent
partitioning [45, 46, 37, 11]. Overlook primarily relies on a
hierarchical histogram [19, 8]. A growing body of work [39,
38, 18] additionally considers data-dependent optimizations
that can improve the accuracy of synopses under certain
query workloads.
A number of papers [39, 37, 19] have investigated the
accuracy of these methods in practice. These papers support
our claim that the synopses used in Overlook give usable,
and often optimal, accuracy in practice.
The idea of public quantization boundaries, or partitions,
has been explored by PINQ [31] and FLEX [21]. Both of
these systems leave it to the data analyst, rather than the
data curator, to specify the quantization boundaries.
Similar ideas are used to analyze streaming data, cf. [16],
[9]. A data aware version of the binary mechanism is pre-
sented in [2, 26]. It uses a private partitioning method that
smooths regions of similar count.
Differentially private visualization. PSI [15] may be
the closest system to Overlook; PSI makes ε-budgeting more
user-friendly by providing a visual interface for users to
interact with and understand the impact of various values of ε.
In contrast to Overlook, PSI assumes a per-user, incremental
ε budget; additionally, PSI is not targeted toward the data
exploration use case.
PINQ [31] provides a case study of a differentially private
map visualization as an application of the framework. [10]
provides methods to make linear and logistic regression plots
differentially private. VisDPT [20] is an interface to view two-
dimensional trajectories in a differentially private manner.
[48] studies the challenges involved in creating meaningful
visualizations under differential privacy.
9. CONCLUSION
We have presented Overlook, a visualization system for
private data that provides interactive latencies both for data
curators and data analysts. Overlook’s novel virtual synopsis
enables it to scale to large data domains while incurring
minimal performance and storage overhead over queries to
raw data. Overlook can integrate with existing query engines
with no intrusive changes. Overlook makes differential pri-
vacy accessible, useful, and performant, making it a practical
privacy tool for the real world.
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